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ABSTRACT 
 
Historical data on US debt and primary surplus suggest the existence of different fiscal regimes which imply 
that, from time to time, US fiscal policy may have violated the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. 
But does evidence of locally unsustainable regimes eventually jeopardize the global sustainability of US public 
debt? We apply a Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability test which derives sufficient conditions on a 
regime-switching fiscal policy feeback rule such that fiscal policy can globally be sustainable while allowing for 
persistent unsustainable regimes. We find significant evidence of a globally Ricardian US fiscal policy, despite 
periodic and persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes. This conclusion remains valid after controlling for the 
reverse causality between the primary balance and the output gap. 
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1 Introduction
Following the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, countercyclical fiscal policies
led to substantial increases in public debt which have finally raised concerns about fiscal sus-
tainability in most OECD countries . The US economy makes no exception in this context as
the data of figure 1 show with the sharp increase in public debt-to-GDP ratio and persistent
primary deficits, eight years after the Great Recession. At first glance, historical data suggest
two distinct fiscal regimes in the US fiscal policy. Indeed, we observe several episodes charac-
terized by an increasing public debt without clear improvement of the primary surplus, which
would signal an unsustainable fiscal policy, but also episodes of increasing primary surplus
following public debt build-ups. For instance, in the early 1980s, primary deficits and debts
respectively increased in proportion to GDP whereas they fell quite substantially in the early
1990s.
Figure 1: Federal debt and primary federal surplus in the US (1940-2016)
Existence of unsustainable fiscal regimes may raise two legitimate concerns about the sustain-
ability of US fiscal policy: first, how long can necessary fiscal adjustments be delayed without
threatening the long-run sustainability of public debt? Second, are sustainable fiscal regimes
sufficiently tight and frequent to ensure the long-run sustainability of US public debt?
This paper investigate these two questions simultaneously and also provides an answer to the
related question: does evidence of unsustainable regimes in US fiscal policy eventually jeop-
ardize the long-run sustainability of public debt? Hence, we apply to US fiscal annual data
from 1940 to 2016 the Regime-Switching MBS test developed in a companion paper. Extend-
ing Bohn (1998)’s framework to regime-switching fiscal policy rule, Aldama and Creel (2017)
derive sufficient conditions on a regime-switching fiscal policy feeback rule such that fiscal
policy would globally be sustainable while allowing for persistent unsustainable regimes.
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We follow a three-step empirical strategy. First, we estimate constant-parameter fiscal policy
rules. We notably control for non-linearities using a quadratic specification of Bohn’s fiscal
rule, and potential endogeneity bias due to reverse causality between primary surplus and out-
put gap. These baseline regressions do not give significant evidence of a sustainable or Ricar-
dian fiscal policy in the US, i.e. a strictly and significant positive response of primary balance
to lagged public debt. Still, these results may be triggered by the fundamental instability in
the relationship between primary surplus and lagged public debt, namely fiscal regimes.
Hence, in a second-step, we estimate a two-state Markov-switching fiscal policy rule in order
to account for differentiated responses of primary surplus to public debt. We find significant
evidence of a sustainable regime that diplays a positive and strongly significant feedback effect
of public debt while the other regime is characterized by a non-significantly feedback effect.
Using estimated Markov-switching fiscal rule, we directly tests the sustainability conditions
developed in Aldama and Creel (2017). Our results indicate that US fiscal policy have been
globally sustainable or Ricardian, despite persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes.
Finally, we address the question of endogeneity in the output gap in the Markov-switching
dynamic regression. We build a measure of expected output gap using an auxiliary regression.
Then, we replace the output gap by its expectation in the Markov-switching fiscal policy rule.
Our results indicate that using expected rather than actual output gap significantly reduces the
instability of the fiscal policy rule, particularly in terms of regime persistence. We also find
that US fiscal policy may have been Ricardian from the early 1960s to the late 2000s and the
Great Recession.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and presents the
methodological framework. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodological framework
A first approach to fiscal sustainability analysis consists in unit-root and stationarity tests or
cointegration tests on fiscal variables without an explicit modelling of fiscal policy behavior.
Seminal investigations in this area are Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Wilcox (1989) for unit-
root and stationarity tests or Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) and Quintos (1995) for the use of
cointegration analysis on various components of public finances. Following their lead, Afonso
and Jalles (2016) compute panel unit-root tests and cointegration tests on revenues, spending,
primary deficits and debts of a group of OECD countries. They find that public debts are not
sustainable. A recent study on US data by Chen (2016) uses quantile cointegration and shows
that fiscal sustainability has been broadly fulfilled from 1960 to 2010. In the vein opened by
Quintos (1995), Chen (2016) studies nonlinearities in the relationship between fiscal instru-
ments. These nonlinearities are central to the understanding of the evolution of public debts
and deficits. Both are related to the business cycles and also to changes in the fiscal legisla-
tion. A change in the debt ceiling may well change the evolution of tax policy or that of public
spending. Chen (2016) concludes that the higher public spending the lower the sustainability
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of US public finances.
Another way of dealing with fiscal sustainability has hinged on the dynamic properties of fis-
cal shocks on real GDP and debt-to-GDP. In a recent contribution with OECD data, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2017) use local-projections to study the asymmetric and nonlinear ef-
fects of fiscal policy shocks on debt-to-GDP ratio, short-term and long-term interest rates, CDS
spreads, real GDP and inflation during expansions or recessions and in a low-debt environ-
ment or a high-debt environment. They show that government spending shocks can have an
important positive effect on growth in recessions and can lead to a reduction in public debt-
to-GDP ratio, hence increasing fiscal sustainability. Moreover, when controlling for the level
of public debt, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko do not find any significant evidence of strong
penalties for fiscal stimulus when public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 100%.
Another strand of the fiscal sustainability literature builds on the explicit modeling behavior
of governments and opposes strong criticisms to the econometric analyses mentioned above
(Bohn, 1995, 2007). By depicting fiscal policy feedback rule, Bohn (1998) argues that a signifi-
cantly positive reaction of a fiscal instrument –usually primary balance-to-GDP or tax receipts-
to-GDP– to lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio ensures fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, if fiscal
instrument’s response to lagged public debt is larger than the real interest rate1, then fiscal
policy follows a debt-stabilizing rule, see Bohn (1998), Mendoza and Ostry (2008), Daniel and
Shiamptanis (2013). Bohn and Mendoza and Ostry both conclude that US fiscal policy and
public debt were sustainable. In addition to strictly linear specifications, Bohn (1998) estimate
nonlinear specifications of fiscal policy rules, including quadratic and cubic terms of debt-to-
GDP ratios. His results indicate a significant and positive feedback effect of quadratic debt on
primary surplus, but a non-significant negative cubic term, showing an "increasing marginal
response of surpluses to changes in debt". In an attempt to shed light on these nonlinearities,
Ghosh et al. (2013b,a) introduce the concept of "fiscal fatigue" in fiscal policy behavior. Accord-
ing to them, the reaction of the primary surplus may be "flatter" at high levels of public debt.
Using the fiscal fatigue property of cubic fiscal policy rules, they propose a method to compute
maximum debt limits depending on policy behavior and risk-neutral lenders. After having
estimated a cubic fiscal policy rule on a panel-data of OECD countries, they estimate country-
specific debt limits under two scenarios –historical vs projected– for the growth-adjusted real
interest rate. Their results suggest that most of OECD countries still have large fiscal spaces.
Alternatively to quadratic or cubic fiscal policy rules, the literature also turned towards time-
varying and regime-switching specifications because of multiple evidence of structural breaks
and regime shifts in standard constant-parameter specifications2. Favero and Monacelli (2005)
investigate the instability of monetary and fiscal policy rules using Markov-switching dynamic
regressions. They notably challenge the common wisdom of a continuously passive or Ricardian
fiscal policy in the US after WWII. They note, in addition, that regime-switching fiscal rules
are better fitting fiscal policy behavior than constant-parameter specifications. Contributing to
the so-called Fiscal Theory of Price-Level, Chung et al. (2007), Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011),
Bianchi (2012) also estimate monetary and fiscal Markov-switching policy rules and provide
1Generally adjusted for the real GDP growth rate, when using GDP-scaled fiscal variables.
2For monetary policy, see Clarida et al. (2000), Auerbach (2002), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) among others.
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evidence of passive fiscal policy regimes. Other contributions to the literature on regime-
switching fiscal policy rules are Burger and Marinkov (2012) and Afonso and Toffano (2013).
Recently, Nguyen et al. (2017) estimate the US fiscal rule using a time-varying parameter model
and show that fiscal sustainability was achieved until 2005. Since then, they argue that US
fiscal policy is no longer sustainable.
Empirical studies on time-varying and regime-switching fiscal policy rules generally and suc-
cesfully identify sub-periods during which the government does not stabilize public debt, and
sometimes even displays a negative feedback effect of lagged public debt on primary surplus.
However, they do not conclude whether the time-varying or regime-switching feature of fiscal
policy threatens (or not) the long-run sustainability of public debt. In the empirical part of this
paper, we will hinge on the recent test by Aldama and Creel (2017) to estimate long-run fiscal
sustainability. In light of the discussion about peaks and troughs in public debt’s evolution
(see figure 1), the point of departure is that a locally or periodically unsustainable fiscal policy
may not necessarily threaten the global or long-run sustainability of public debt. In particular,
under sufficient conditions on regime-specific response of primary surplus to lagged public
debt and on expected durations of regimes, (i) the No-Ponzi Game (NPG) condition or (ii) the
Debt-Stabilizing condition may hold on the entire period despite periodically unsustainable
policies.
NPG condition holds when
γS >
∣∣∣γNS ∣∣∣dNSdS (1)
with γS and γNS being the respective responses of the primary surplus to public debt in the
sustainable regime (S) and to the non-sustainable regime (NS), and with dS and dNS the re-
spective average duration of the sustainable and unsustainable regimes.
The NPG condition requires that the initial public debt-to-GDP ratio would be backed by the
sum of future expected and discounted real primary surpluses-to-GDP. The NPG condition per
se does not impose any stationarity restriction, see Bohn (2007). Then an ever-increasing public
debt-to-GDP ratio will eventually reach the fiscal limit on the level of primary surplus govern-
ments can run (Daniel, 2014, Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2013). As a consequence a stronger sus-
tainability constraint requires a stable public debt-to-GDP ratio around a long-run value with
a sufficient safety margin with respect to the fiscal limit.
The Debt-Stability condition therefore holds when
γS >
∣∣∣γNS ∣∣∣dNSdS + r − y1 + y dS + dNSdS (2)
where r and y are the real interest rate and the growth rate of real GDP.
It must be stressed that the Debt-Stabilizing condition may not be stricter than the NPG con-
dition. First, the Debt-Stabilizing condition would be looser than the NPG condition if the
average real interest rate on public debt r were lower than the growth rate of real GDP y –
which does not imply that the economy is dynamically inefficient. Abel et al. (1989) have shown
that, in a stochastic economy with risk-free and risky assets, the correct theoretical condition
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for dynamic efficiency is that the risky interest rate must be larger than the growth rate of
output; not the safe rate. Regarding empirical assessment of dynamic efficiency, Abel et al.
address the difficulty of measuring the actual rate of return on risky capital: they suggest to
test whether investment is lower than capital income at aggregated level (dynamic efficiency)
or not (dynamic inefficiency). They found that 7 advanced OECD economies including the
US were dynamically efficient at the end of the 1980s; Geerolf (2013) recently updated their
empirical work and overturned their results. He finds that OECD advanced economies could
have over-accumulated capital. Second, if the economy is actually dynamically efficient, hence
the correct sustainability condition is the NPG condition rather than a Debt-Stabilizing con-
dition. The reason is the following: a government could simultaneously stabilize its debt and
run a Ponzi Scheme against its creditors which would be a source of sub-optimality for rational
creditors.
3 Dataset
We use historical data on federal debt, expenditures, receipts, primary budget balance as well
as nominal and real GDP and GDP implicit deflator from the Office of Management and Bud-
get. Our dataset covers years ranging from 1940 to 2016.3
Following most studies on US fiscal policy, we use the federal debt held by the public as a mea-
sure of consolidated gross public debt rather than total gross federal debt; this choice is usu-
ally motivated by the fact that total gross federal debt includes intragovernmental obligations
to social security and other trusts funds, see Bohn (2008). We measure the nominal interest
rate on public debt using the ratio of net interest charge on public debt held by the public, as
in Bohn (1998, 2008). Hence, real interest rate will be calculated as the ex post real rate using
GDP implicit deflator.
We follow the literature on Model-Based Sustainability analysis (Bohn, 1998, Mendoza and
Ostry, 2008) and use the output gap and a measure of cyclical real public spending as regres-
sors in the fiscal policy rule. Congressional Budget Office’s estimates of potential real GDP are
not available for years prior to 1949, hence we use a standard HP filtered output gap measure
taking the cyclical component of log real GDP. Similarly, cyclical real public spending is also
defined as the cyclical component of log real public spending. When using the HP filter, we
choose a smoothing parameter λ equal to 6.25 rather than 100, according to Ravn and Uhlig
(2002)’s rule.4 Figure 2 describes the series obtained.
3Data are available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.
4Ravn and Uhlig show that filter parameter should be adjusted by multiplying it with the fourth power of the
observation frequency ratio. For instance, considering annual and quarterly data of a same time series, choosing
a smoothing parameter λ = 100 on annual data produces inconsistent HP-filtered trend with respect to the trend
obtained on quarterly data with λ = 1600.
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Figure 2: HP filtered output gap and cyclical real public spending (1940-2016)
4 Empirical results
We follow a three-step empirical strategy. First, we estimate constant-parameter fiscal policy
rules and perform standard Model-Based Sustainability tests. In particular, we estimate fiscal
policy rules using the IV estimator to control for a reverse causality bias between primary
surplus and output gap. Strikingly, the constant-parameter estimates do not allow to conclude
to the sustainability of US public debt, even after controlling for a potential endogeneity bias
in the output gap. Second, we estimate a two-state Markov-switching fiscal policy rule. We
are able to conclude in favour of global sustainability despite periodic violations of the NPG
and Debt-Stabilizing conditions. Third, we estimate an alternative specification of the Regime-
switching fiscal policy rule in which we replace the output gap by its expected level, obtained
from an auxiliary first-step regression and confirm the main result of the paper.
4.1 Standard Model-Based Sustainability Tests
We estimate the following fiscal policy rule
st = α +γbt−1 +αxxt +αg g˜t +ut (3)
where st is the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, bt−1 is the end-of-period public debt-to-GDP
ratio, xt is the output gap and g˜t is cyclical real public spending. Estimates of linear fiscal
policy rules generally display a strong auto-correlation in the residuals hence we estimate a
model with first-order autoregressive residuals ut = (1 − ρL)−1εt with εt i.i.d. N (0,σ2). Thus,
we estimate equation (3) using non-linear least square (NLS). In order to control for the re-
verse causality bias between primary surplus and output gap, we also estimate equation (3)
using instrumental variables. We use two lags of output gap and lagged primary surplus as
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instruments.
Columns (1) and (3) of table 1 show the results for NLS and IV estimates of equation (3).
First, we do not find any significant evidence of a stricly positive feedback effect of public debt
on primary surplus. Hence, standard MBS analysis would conclude to the unsustainability
of US fiscal policy all over the period: large build-ups of public debt do not seem positively
correlated with a significant increase of primary surplus between 1942 and 2016. Regarding
former evidence of a sustainable US fiscal policy (Bohn, 2008), these results should probably
be interpreted as evidence of instability in coefficient estimates of linear fiscal policy rules
rather than evidence of unsustainable fiscal policy.5 Second, IV estimates display a positive
reaction of primary surplus to lagged debt but still non-significant. This result suggests that
accounting for the potential reverse causality bias between primary surplus and output gap
does not significantly impact the estimates of primary surplus’s correlation to public debt.
We also estimate a quadratic specification of the fiscal policy rule
st = α +γ1bt−1 +γ2b2t−1 +αxxt +αg g˜t +ut (4)
both using NLS and IV estimators, to account for potential non-linearities in the relationship
between primary surplus and public debt. A positive coefficient associated to squared debt-
to-GDP ratio would indicate that the response of primary surplus increases with the level of
public debt whereas a negative coefficient would testify for "fiscal fatigue", both suggesting
non-linearities in primary surplus-public debt regressions. In table 1, quadratic term is never
statistically different from zero whatever the estimation method.
Table 1: Standard Model-Based Sustainability Tests (1942-2016)
Dependent variable: st (1) NLS (2) NLS (3) IV (4) IV
Constant -0.0077 0.0119 -0.0352 0.0173
(0.0181) (0.0316) (0.0450) (0.0711)
Lagged debt bt−1 0.0049 -0.0720 0.0668 -0.1148
(0.0377) (0.1047) (0.0990) (0.2358)
Quadratic lagged debt b2t−1 0.0650 0.1255
(0.0770) (0.1567)
Output gap xt 0.3372*** 0.3435*** 0.1552 0.2707
(0.0812) (0.0816) (0.2566) (0.2154)
Cyclical government spending gt -0.2394*** -0.2353*** -0.1753*** -0.1921***
(0.0187) (0.0183) (0.0573) (0.0409)
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
Nb. of obs 75 75 75 75
Durbin-Watson stat 2.22 2.29 2.23 2.36
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are significant at 1% level (***), 5%
level (**) or 10% level (*). All models control for first-order serially correlated residuals. Equations (3)-(4) are
estimated by IV estimators. We use lagged values of output gap xt−1, xt−2 and lagged primary surplus st−1 as
instruments.
5Reasons for the differences between this first set of results and former empirical results on US fiscal sustainabil-
ity drawing on fiscal rules (Bohn, 1998, 2008) are twofold. First, the sample are not similar. Bohn (2008) uses data
from 1791 to 2012 (or 2003). Second, Bohn uses military spending as a proxy for cyclical government spending.
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4.2 Regime-Switching Model-Based Sustainability Tests
Based on constant-parameter estimates of fiscal policy rules, linear and non-linear, we do not
find significant evidence in favor of a sustainable (or Ricardian) fiscal policy in the US between
1942 and 2016. In this section, we argue that these results may be driven by the instability, i.e.
regime-switching properties, of fiscal policy rules’ estimates.
We estimate the following Markov-switching fiscal rule in equation (5) by direct maximization
of the log likelihood, following Hamilton (1989):
st = α(zt) +γ(zt)bt−1 +α(zt)xxt +α(zt)g g˜t +ut (5)
where zt is an unobserved two-state Markov process with constant transition probabilities.
We estimate our model with first-order autocorrelated residuals ut = (1−ρL)−1σεt with εt i.i.d.
N (0,1) and regime-invariant standard error of residuals σ . We use 10 000 random draws of ini-
tial values for the ML algorithm in order to avoid a local maximum and reduce the dependence
of final results on initial values. We also define the long-run estimate α of regime-switching
parameters using ergodic probabilities (pi1,pi2)
α ≡ α1pi1 +α2pi2 (6)
as well as its estimated standard-deviation
σα ≡
√
(σα1pi1)
2 + (σα2pi2)
2 + 2Cov(α1,α2) (7)
We report estimation results in table 2 and smoothed and filtered probabilities in figure 3.
Table 2: Estimated baseline Markov-switching fiscal rule (1942-2016)
Dependent variable: st Regime 1 Regime 2 Long-run estimates
Constant -0.0189 -0.0245* -0.0207*
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0113)
Lagged debt bt−1 0.0221 0.0865*** 0.0423**
(0.0219) (0.0242) (0.0205)
Output gap xt 0.2871*** 0.8671*** 0.4690***
(0.0545) (0.1158) (0.0528)
Cyclical government spending gt -0.1758*** -0.4137*** -0.2504***
(0.0130) (0.0239) (0.0105)
Regime properties Transition prob. pii Ergodic prob. pii Expected duration di
i=1 0.92 0.69 12.47
i=2 0.82 0.31 5.70
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.76 Log Likelihood 241.5045
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are significant at 1% level (***), 5%
level (**) or 10% level (*). The model control for regime-invariant first-order serially correlated residuals.
First, our estimated Markov-switching fiscal policy rule identifies two regimes. We find a
strongly significant positive response of primary surplus to lagged public debt in regime 2
which we label sustainable, while the response of primary surplus to lagged public debt is
non-significant but positive in regime 1, which we label unsustainable. Second, the sustain-
able regime appear less persistent than the unsustainable one. Furthermore, estimated prob-
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Figure 3: Baseline model, estimated probabilities of sustainable regime
abilities of the sustainable regime suggests that US fiscal policy have periodically been non-
Ricardian since 1942, particularly from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. Indeed, the sus-
tainable regime has an expected duration of 5.7 years against 12.5 years for the unsustainable
one. This evidence of recurring and persistent regime changes may explain a posteriori why
constant-parameter estimates of fiscal policy rules (in section 4.1) could not identify a signif-
icant positive reaction of primary surplus to lagged public debt. Finally, long-run estimate of
the feedback effect of public debt on primary surplus is significantly positive, which overturns
former results and make them consistent with former results by (Bohn, 1998, 2008).
Given γNS is not statistically different from zero, the NPG condition depends exclusively on
the sign of γS . The Debt-Stabilizing condition includes the growth-adjusted real interest rate
(r−y)/(1+y) and implies to choose an adequate measure for it. Bai-Perron regressions allowing
for multiple breaks suggest significant different average growth-adjusted real rates by sub-
periods in the US, see figure 4 and table 3. Hence, we present both full-sample and sub-sample
tests for the Debt-Stabilizing condition, using estimated average growth-adjusted real rates.
Finally, we test NPG and Debt-Stabilizing conditions using one-sided Student tests (table 4).
Table 3: Average growth-adjusted real interest rate
1941-1952 1953-1981 1982-2016 1941-2016
Estimated average -0.0806 -0.0315 0.0036 -0.0231
Robust standard-error (0.0121) (0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0079)
Notes: sub-sample averages are determined using a Bai-Perron breakpoints regression; full-sample (1941-2016)
average is obtained from a simple OLS regression. HAC robust standard-errors are reported in parenthesis.
All tests conclude that the estimated Markov-switching fiscal policy rule meets both No-Ponzi
Game and Debt-Stabilizing conditions. Regarding the latter condition, this is true whatever
the period considered to estimate the long-run growth-adjusted real rate. In particular, our
results suggest that US fiscal policy has not used the fiscal rooms for maneuver stemming
from negative growth-adjusted real rates to run a Ponzi Scheme. Finally, despite recurring and
persistent unsustainable (or non-Ricardian) regimes, we find evidence of a globally sustainable
10
Figure 4: Growth-adjusted real interest rate (1941-2016)
Table 4: Regime-switching MBS tests results
NPG condition Debt-Stabilizing condition
Full-sample 1941-2016 1941-1952 1953-1981 1982-2016
t-stat 3.5768 4.5327 6.9120 4.8798 3.4293
Unilateral p-value 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005
Notes: these student tests assume that γNS is virtually equal to zero from estimates obtained in table 2.
fiscal policy in the US: sustainable regimes are sufficiently tight and sufficiently frequent to
ensure that public debt will be backed by future expected present-value primary surpluses.
4.2.1 Alternative specification
As such, results reported in table 4 show that the fulfilment of the Debt-Stabilizing condition is
robust to different sub-periods and different values of the growth-adjusted real interest rate. In
the baseline model however, we do not control for the potential reverse causality bias between
primary surplus and output gap. Consequently, we report an alternative specification in which
we use a measure of expected output gap that we build from a preliminary-step regression.
We regress the output gap on its two consecutive lags, plus the first lag of primary balance, the
second lag of the debt to GDP ratio and cyclical outlays. Estimates of the first-stage regression
are reported in appendix A. Then, we compute the expected output gap as the fitted values
from the previous regression and use it as an exogenous regressors in the following Markov-
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swithcing fiscal policy rule:
st = α(zt) +γ(zt)bt−1 +α(zt)xEt−1 xt +α(zt)g g˜t +ut (8)
with first-order serially correlated residuals, following the same procedure as for equation (5)
except that we use a Huber-White robust variance-covariance estimator because of the pres-
ence of a generated regressor.6 We report RS-MBS results in table 5. The distinction between
the two fiscal regimes is much less visible than in the baseline. The first regime is weakly sus-
tainable –it was unsustainable in the baseline– whereas the second regime is strongly sustain-
able. Also in contrast with the baseline, there is much less volatility in fiscal regimes. It can
be seen in the average duration of regimes –they are substantially higher than in the baseline–
and in the smoothed probabilities of sustainable regime. Figure 5 shows that, except before
1950 and after 2009, US public finances are characterized by a sustainable regime. A striking
result though relates to the long-run estimate of the fiscal policy rule. The long-run sensitiv-
ity of the primary surplus to lagged debt is very close to what was achieved in the baseline.
Both specifications –with and without corrections for potential reverse causality between the
primary surplus and the output gap– lead us to conclude to global US debt sustainability. The
alternative specification with correction displays a greater stability of the fiscal policy rule and
a strongly persistent sustainable regime with respect to the baseline model.
Table 5: Estimated Markov-switching fiscal rule with expected output gap (1943-2016)
Dependent variable: st Regime 1 Regime 2 Long-run estimates
Constant -0.0736*** -0.0254** -0.0380
(0.0188) (0.0108) (0.0113)
Lagged debt bt−1 0.0658* 0.0655*** 0.0656**
(0.0354) (0.0218) (0.0226)
Expected output gap Et−1 xt 0.6799*** 0.4091*** 0.4799***
(0.1655) (0.0704) (0.0680)
Cyclical government spending gt -0.2813*** -0.1523*** -0.1860***
(0.0291) (0.0179) (0.0161)
Regime properties Transition prob. pii Ergodic prob. pii Expected duration di
i=1 0.92 0.26 11.94
i=2 0.97 0.74 33.75
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.32 Log Likelihood 240.5754
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are significant
at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*). The model control for regime-invariant first-order serially
correlated residuals.
These findings suggest that ignoring both regime-switching and reverse causality bias between
primary balance and output gap may lead to underestimate the long-run response of primary
balance to public debt and, as a result, to too conservative conclusions about fiscal sustainabil-
ity.
6Using generated regressors in the second-step (Markov-switching) regression generally imply heteroscedastic-
ity in residuals, hence we use a Huber-White variance-covariance estimator following the usual practice in empir-
ical studies with generated regressors. While point estimates would likely be unbiased under the assumption of
valid instruments, the use of Huber-White estimator would not yield a full-correction of estimated standard-errors
from the bias induced by generated regressors. Hence parameters’ significance should be interpreted with caution
and, accordingly we do not run RS-MBS global sustainability tests.
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Figure 5: Model with expected output gap: estimated probabilities of sustainable regime
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the global (or long-run) sustainability of US public debt. The ups and
downs of public debt raise two concerns: first, how long is it possible to postpone fiscal con-
solidation before public debt becomes unsustainable? And when fiscal consolidation occurs, is
it tight enough to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability? We draw on Aldama and Creel (2017)
and test the sufficient conditions on regime-switching fiscal policy feedback rules that permit
to achieve a No-Ponzi Game and a Debt-Stabilizing condition. When these conditions are met,
global sustainability is ensured despite persistent unsustainable fiscal regimes.
The main outcome of the paper is that fiscal policy in the US has been globally sustainable
since 1940. On average, a 12-year period of fiscal consolidation’s postponement does not pre-
clude global fiscal sustainability, provided periods of fiscal consolidation last almost 6 years
on average and embed a sharp reaction of primary balance towards lagged public debt (the
semi-elasticity is equal to 8.7%). Introducing the possibility of an instability in the relation-
ship between primary balance and public debt via fiscal regimes enables to highlight periods of
sustainability and unsustainability and gives contrasting results vis-à-vis those obtained with
a linear (or non-linear) fiscal feedback rule without regime switches, for which we found no
evidence of fiscal sustainability.
Future research on US fiscal sustainability may go in two mutually non-exclusive directions.
First, the use of quarterly data may reinforce the tests’ statistical properties. The limitation
with the use of quarterly data relates to public debt. Usually, they are only genuinely annual in
that they reflect the annual flows of deficits and annual revaluations. In the US case, it should
be possible however to use genuine public debt quarterly data, i.e. data which have not been
transformed into quarterly data a posteriori. Second, the estimations of global sustainability
abstract from the monetary regime and from a comprehensive macro feedback. As for the
latter, we show that the main outcome of the paper remains valid after controlling for the
reverse causality between the primary balance and the output gap. Introducing more macro
feedbacks, like inflation dynamics and a monetary policy rule, could be done in a larger macro
13
framework, like a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model as advised recently by Leeper
and Li (2017). It would permit to better highlight the endogeneity of fiscal policy to the macro
context and to embed the test of global sustainability into a comprehensive framework.
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A Expected output gap estimates
The first-stage equation is:
xt = φ0 + ρ1xt−1 + ρ2xt−2 +φ1st−1 +φ2bt−2 +φ3g˜t + εt (9)
We report OLS estimates of equation (9) in table 6. Then, we define the expected output gap
Et−1 xt by the fitted values xˆt obtained from estimated equation (9).
Table 6: Estimated equation for expected output gap
Dependent variable: Output gap xt Estimates
Constant 0.0027
(0.0058)
xt−1 0.7976***
(0.1191)
xt−2 -0.4360***
(0.0951)
st−1 -0.1001*
(0.0680)
bt−2 -0.0074
(0.0123)
g˜t 0.0494*
(0.0243)
Adjusted R2 0.7961
Durbin-Watson stat 2.1256
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Reported estimates are significant at 1% level (***), 5%
level (**) or 10% level (*).
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